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Abstract
Supply chain risk management is an active area of research and there is a research gap of ex-
ploring established risk quantification techniques in other fields for application in the context of
supply chain management. We have developed a novel framework for quantification of supply
chain risks that integrates two techniques of Bayesian belief network and Game theory. Bayesian
belief network can capture interdependency between risk factors and Game theory can assess risks
associated with conflicting incentives of stakeholders within a supply network. We introduce a
new node termed ‘Game theoretic risks’ in Bayesian network that gets its qualitative and quant-
itative structure from the Game theory based analysis of the existing policies and partnerships
within a supply network. We have applied our proposed risk modeling framework on the devel-
opment project of Boeing 787 aircraft. Two different Bayesian networks have been modeled; one
representing the Boeing’s perceived supply chain risks and the other depicting real time supply
chain risks faced by the company. The qualitative structures of both the models were developed
through cognitive maps that were constructed from the facts outlined in a case study. The
quantitative parts were populated based on intuition and subsequently updated with the facts.
The Bayesian network model incorporating quantification of game theoretic risks provides all the
reasons for the delays and financial loss of the project. Furthermore, the proactive strategies
identified in various case studies were verified through our model. Such an integrated application
of two different quantification techniques in the realm of supply chain risk management bridges
the mentioned research gap. Successful application of the framework justifies its potential for
further testing in other supply chain risk quantification scenarios.
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1 Introduction
There are a number of key debates in the literature of risk focusing on the qualitative and
quantitative aspects of risk assessment and therefore, choice of methodology must be given
due consideration before its application in the field of supply chain risk management [1]. The
application of risk theory to supply chain management is still in its early stages of research
and there is requirement of conducting empirical studies of already established models. There
is a major research gap of exploring established risk practices in other fields for application
in the domain of supply chain risk management [1].
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2 A Novel Framework for Quantification of Supply Chain Risks
This research study attempts to bridge the mentioned research gap by introducing a novel
approach of combining Game theory and Bayesian belief network techniques. Game theory
is used to model situations in which supply chain stakeholders have conflicting incentives
while Bayesian belief network is a powerful technique to model the causal interdependency
between various risk factors. Such a hybrid risk quantification framework has got its unique
benefits as the two approaches complement each other and ignoring risks associated with
conflicting incentives results in incorrect modeling of the real time situation.
The framework has been validated against an existing case study [2]. The case study was
used to construct cognitive maps followed by modeling of the Bayesian networks. Working
papers [3, 4] were consulted for establishing game theoretic modeling. This paper adapts the
existing game models to incorporate features of continuous time domain and present value of
money. Successful implementation of the framework on a case study advocates its potential
for application in other supply chain risk management scenarios.
The concept of supply chain risk management is presented in Section 2. Basics of Bayesian
network and Game theory are explained in Sections 3 and 4 respectively. Section 5 delineates
the design of a novel framework that captures the dynamics of interacting risk factors. The
details of the software are described in Section 6. Section 7 presents results and analysis
while the conclusion is drawn in Section 8.
2 Supply Chain Risk Management
There are different perceptions of risk in the context of supply chain risk management. There
is no clear distinction between risk and uncertainty in supply chain operations [5]. Risk
is attributed to uncertain or unreliable sources that finally contribute to the supply chain
disruptions while the uncertainty relates to the matching of fluctuating supply and demand
in the processes. There are two important aspects of risk; the probability of risk event
and its final impact. Most of the researchers have focused on the negative consequences of
impact [6, 7, 8] but there is ambiguity regarding the choice of risk event itself. Similarly,
there is no consensus regarding the selection of expected (supplier quality problems) or
unexpected (wars, strikes, terrorist attacks) features of risk events. Risk in supply chain
management relates to an event with small probability occurring abruptly that incurs major
loss to the system. Supply chain risk management is defined as “the management of supply
chain risk through coordination or collaboration among the supply chain partners so as to
ensure profitability and continuity” [6].
Based on a thorough study by carrying out direct observations of the researchers’ output
and gathering evidence through surveys of focus groups of researchers, following are the
major research gaps in the field of supply chain risk management [9]:
No clear consensus on the definition of supply chain risk management
Lack of research on the reactive strategies once the risk event has occurred
Shortage of empirical research in the field
Based on a thorough review of literature in the fields of risk and supply chain risk
management, researchers have recommended following future research directions [1]:
Lack of understanding of risk in supply chain risk management researchers
Need for exploring already established risk practices in other fields for application in
supply chain risk management
Requirement of conducting case study based empirical studies in order to determine the
current risk management methods used by various supply chains
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Need for developing robust and well-grounded supply chain risk management models that
can only be materialized through clear understanding of risk and conducting sufficient
number of empirical case studies
The risks can be viewed with respect to three broad perspectives [9]:
A ‘butterfly’ depiction of risk that separates underlying causes, actual events and ultimate
consequences
Impact based perception in terms of disruptions and delays
Network perspective in terms of local-and-global causes and local-and-global effects
3 Bayesian Belief Network
Bayesian belief network (BBN) is a graphical representation of causal relationships between
variables and associated uncertainty in the dependency in terms of conditional probabilit-
ies [10]. The variables are represented by nodes while an arc (directed between two nodes)
represents direct causal relationship. The network must be an acyclic directed graph which
means that none of the nodes can be traced back while following the direction of arcs. Each
node is provided with a set of conditional probabilities except the root nodes, in order to
indicate the influence of parent nodes on the child node.
3.1 Application of BBN in Supply Chain Risk Management
Bayesian belief networks are helpful in benchmarking supplier risk profiles that can be used
for the determination of key suppliers having major potential impact on revenues of an
organization [11]. The model is designed for determining the supplier’s external, operational
and network risks. The results of the study can help managers focus on key suppliers based
on the maximum Value at Risk (VAR) posed to the company. However, the proposed model
seems to be industry specific and therefore, the generality of the Bayesian network is limited
in scope. In another similar study, suppliers are benchmarked against their risks based on
the sensitivity analysis [12]. However, a major limitation of the study is difficulty to get data
from current and potential suppliers in populating the Bayesian network. Bayesian network
has also been applied in managing risks associated with large engineering project [13]. A
combination of Bayesian network and Total Cost of Ownership methods has also been used
for selection of potential suppliers [14]. Bayesian network is suitable for modeling risks in
case of buyer’s incomplete and uncertain information about the suppliers.
4 Game Theory
Game theory was developed to explain the rationale for taking economic decisions that would
not have occurred on the basis of simple cost-benefit analysis. Game theory can help the
operations managers take appropriate decisions within a supply chain context [15]. A game
in a business setting has following four basic elements [16]:
The players (supply chain stakeholders)
The rules of the game (policies, constraints)
The complete set of actions or decisions for each player
The outcomes or pay-offs resulting from each set of decisions
SCOR’14
4 A Novel Framework for Quantification of Supply Chain Risks
4.1 Simultaneous-Move Games 
In simultaneous-move games, each player must take action at the same time or 
without knowing the move of other player. The players may have complete information of 
the pay-offs for each set of decisions. The most popular simultaneous-move game is the 
prisoner’s dilemma where two criminals are apprehended by the Police and asked 
separately to testify against the other (Nash, 1951). The game is modeled in Table 2. Both 
the players can either confess or deny. The first pay-off relates to the row player (Prisoner 1) 
while the second pay-off represents pay-off of column player (Prisoner 2). If both confess, 
each gets 2 years of imprisonment. If both deny, each gets 1 year of imprisonment. 
However, if one confesses and the other denies, the one confessing goes free while the 
other denying is awarded 3 years of imprisonment. They both can be better off by denying 
but the Nash equilibrium for this game is both prisoners confessing. 
Table 2. Prisoner's dilemma. 
  Prisoner 2 
  Confess Deny 
Prisoner 1 
Confess -2, -2 0, -3 
Deny -3, 0 -1, -1 
4.2 Sequential-Move Games 
In sequential-move games, players take decisions in sequence. Each player will try to 
reason backwards from the terminal nodes determining the best course of action. An 
example of such a game is provided in Figure 4. Solution of such games can be obtained 
through backward induction. Both the players represent competing industries and need to 
decide on the price of a product. The strategy of Player 1 is represented by (H, L) while that 
of Player 2 is given as (HH, HL, LH, LL). Player 1 has to take the decision first followed by 
Player 2. By looking at the terminal nodes, it is clear that LL is the best strategy for Player 2 
and knowing this, Player 1’s best strategy is to choose L. Thus, (L, LL) is the perfect Nash 
Equilibrium for this game.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Sequential-move game 
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Figure 1 Prisoner’s dilemma.
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Figure 2 A sequential ove game.
4.1 Simultaneous-Move Games
In simultaneous-move games, each player must take action at the same time or without
knowing the moves of other players. The players may have complete information of the
pay-offs for each set of decisions. The most popular simultaneous-move game is the prisoner’s
dilemma where two criminals are apprehended by the Police and asked separately to testify
against each other [17]. The game is modeled in Figure 1. Each player can either confess
or deny. The first pay-off relates to the row player (Prisoner 1) while the second pay-off
corresponds to the column player (Prisoner 2). If both players confess, each gets 2 years of
imprisonment. If both deny, each gets 1 year of imprisonment. However, if one confesses and
the other denies, the one confessing goes free while the other denying is awarded 3 years of
imprisonment. Both the prisoners can be in a better situation by denying but the solution
(Nash equilibrium) for this game is both prisoners confessing.
I Definition 1. A Nash equilibrium is an action profile a* with the property that no player i
can do better by choosing an action different from ai*, given that every other player j adheres
to aj*. [18]
4.2 Sequential-Move Games
In sequential-move games, players take decisions in sequence. An example of such a game is
provided in Figure 2. Solution of such games can be obtained through backward induction.
Both the players represent competing industries and need to decide on the price of a product.
The strategy of Player 1 is represented by (H, L) while that of Player 2 is given as (HH,
HL, LH, LL). Player 1 has to take the decision first followed by Player 2. By looking at the
terminal nodes, it is clear that LL is the best strategy for Player 2 and knowing this, Player
1’s best strategy is to choose L. Thus, (L, LL) is the solution (subgame perfect equilibrium)
for this game.
I Definition 2. A subgame perfect equilibrium is a strategy profile s* with the property that
in no subgame can any player i do better by choosing a strategy different from si*, given that
every other player j adheres to sj*. [18]
5 A Novel Framework
The novel framework of combining the two techniques of Bayesian belief network and
Game theory is shown in Figure 3. The hybrid framework reveals complementary effect
of integrating these two modeling methods. Majority of the supply chain quantitative
modeling schemes do not consider the risks of misaligned objectives (conflicting incentives)
among supply chain partners. Modeling these risks through the Game theory approach and
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subsequent incorporation in the Bayesian belief network provide more realistic approach
towards quantifying the supply chain risks. Bayesian networks have the advantage of
capturing dynamic nature of the interacting risk factors.
Initially, the key risk factors are identified within the supply chain followed by qualitative
modeling of the Bayesian network. Game theoretic modeling of the conflicting incentives is
carried out through a detailed analysis of available information in the form of policies and/or
partnerships. The players are identified and their strategies are established followed by the
determination of their pay-offs. Finally, game theoretic analysis is performed and results
are incorporated in the Bayesian network in the form of a small network of ‘Game theoretic
risks’. The ‘Game theoretic risks’ node is connected to an appropriate impact node and the
conditional probability table of the child node is populated based on the game theoretic
modeling results.
The entire Bayesian network is populated with conditional probability tables followed by
the initial updating. Sensitivity analysis of the game theoretic risks is performed. In case
of sensitivity being high, a fair strategy is devised followed by the game theoretic analysis
of misaligned objectives. The loop is repeated until the acceptable sensitivity results are
obtained. This process is followed by the sensitivity analysis of rest of the risk factors followed
by determination of proactive risk mitigation strategies.
6 Software
The cognitive maps have been constructed in Decision Explorer. Bayesian belief networks
can be modeled in a number of software including Hugin, AgenaRisk, Graphical Network
Interface (GeNie), etc. We used GeNie for modeling and analyzing the networks. The
software has been developed by the Decision Systems Laboratory, University of Pittsburg.
7 Analysis and Results
The developed framework is applied on an existing case study concerning the development
project of Boeing 787 aircraft [2]. The analysis and results of Game theory and Bayesian
network techniques are presented in following sections.
7.1 Game Theoretic Analysis
The discrete time based Game theoretic analysis concerning the development project of Boeing
787 aircraft revealed that there were conflicting incentives among the strategic partners [3].
We have developed our new game models on the basis of same study incorporating features of
present value of money and continuous timeframe. Every project comprises two components
of costs; direct and indirect costs. Direct costs relate to each task of the project including
costs covering labor, material, shipping, etc. Indirect costs do not relate directly to the tasks
but these are linked to the project duration. Overhead, delaying penalty, order cancellations
and financial losses are some of the examples of indirect costs. A longer task is considered to
lower direct costs while a longer project increases indirect costs [19].
The direct cost of a task reduces with the duration representing a convex function as
shown in Figure 4. ‘Xi’ indicates the scheduled timeframe of the task. If either the Boeing or
a Tier-1 supplier delays its task, it gets saving represented by ‘si’. In case of expediting the
task, there is an associated cost represented by ‘ci’. The indirect cost of a project increases
with the project duration representing a convex function as shown in Figure 4. ‘Xs’ indicates
the scheduled timeframe of the suppliers’ tasks while ‘Xm’ indicates the scheduled timeframe
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7. Analysis and Results 
The developed framework is applied on an existing case study of Boeing 787 (Tang et al., 
2009). The analysis and results of the game theoretic and Bayesian network techniques are 
presented in following sections.  
7.1 Game Theoretic Analysis 
The discrete time based game theoretic analysis of the Boeing 787 Project revealed 
that there were misaligned incentives among the strategic partners (Xu Xin, 2013). We have 
built our new game theoretic model on the basis of same study exploring the possibility of 
incorporating time value of money and continuous timeframe. Every project comprises two  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The project network is shown in Figure 8. It assumes that the all the Tier-1 suppliers 
perform their tasks in parallel and the overall time taken by the suppliers is determined by 
the supplier completing its task at the end. After completion of the tasks by the suppliers, 
Boeing performs the final assembling stage. The number of suppliers is indicated by ‘N’. 
Figure 5. Variation of indirect cost with project duration. 
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Figure 4 Variation of direct and indirect costs with task and project duration respectively.
of the Boeing’s task. If the resultant time of the two tasks exceeds the scheduled time, there
is a penalty ‘pi’ whereas expediting the project results in the reward ‘ri’ for each partner.
It is assumed that all the Tier-1 suppliers perform their tasks in parallel and the overall
time taken by the suppliers is determined by the supplier completing its task at the end.
After completion of tasks by the suppliers, Boeing performs the final assembling phase.
7.1.1 Strategic Loss Sharing Partnership
The strategic partnership was introduced by Boeing in order to reduce its financial risks.
Each firm was supposed to bear the direct and indirect costs whereas final payment was
to be made only after the successful culmination of the project. If a firm delays its task
and the project gets delayed, all the firms incur additional indirect costs but the delaying
firm saves from its direct costs. The firms having completed the tasks in time, are unfairly
penalized because of the project delay caused by the delaying firm. As the firms were not
made responsible exclusively for their specific actions, this type of partnership resulted into
‘moral hazard’ [20]. There were misaligned objectives as every supplier would consider the
possibility of other partner delaying the respective task and in case of delivering the task in
time, the supplier would lose the amount contrary to the delaying suppliers gaining the same.
We will present various forms of games in order to analyze the game theoretic perspective of
Boeing’s partnership.
In the first form of game, we consider only one Tier-1 supplier and Boeing. Each player
can either delay (D) or keep (K) the task schedule. The extensive form of this sequential-
move game is presented in Figure 5. Assuming the marginal benefits being lower than the
marginal costs for delaying, Boeing’s best strategy is to keep the project in time while
the supplier also completes the task in time.
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misaligned objectives as every supplier would consider the possibility of other partner 
delaying the project and in case of delivering the task in time, there was cost associated as 
opposed to the savings being gained by others. We will present various forms of games in 
order to analyze the game theoretic perspective of Boeing’s partnership. 
• Game between a Supplier and Boeing (two actions for each player) 
In the first form of game, we consider only one Tier-1 supplier and Boeing. Each of the 
players can either delay (D) or keep (K) its task schedule. The extensive form of this 
sequential game is presented in Figure 9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assuming the marginal benefits are lower than the marginal costs for delaying, 
Boeing’s best strategy is to keep the project in time while the supplier would also complete 
the task in time.  
• Game between two Suppliers and Boeing (two actions for each player) 
Now, we extend the game to two suppliers and Boeing. The three players’ game is 
presented in Figure 10. The dotted line represents simultaneous game between the two 
suppliers as they are assumed to run the tasks in parallel. Assuming the marginal penalty 
being higher than the marginal saving from delaying, the Boeing’s best strategy would be to 
keep the schedule. Having established this fact from the extensive form of the game, the 
game between suppliers can be modeled in matrix form as shown in Table 3.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Sequential-move game between a supplier and Boeing (two actions for each player). 
Boeing 
Supplier 
D 
K 
D 
K 
D 
K 
−𝑝𝑠(𝑥𝑠 + 𝑥𝑚) + 𝑠𝑠(𝑥𝑠) ,−𝑝𝑚(𝑥𝑠 + 𝑥𝑚) + 𝑠𝑚(𝑥𝑚) 
−𝑝𝑠(𝑥𝑠 + 𝑋𝑚) + 𝑠𝑠(𝑥𝑠) ,−𝒑𝒎(𝒙𝒔 + 𝑿𝒎) 
−𝑝𝑠(𝑋𝑠 + 𝑥𝑚) ,−𝑝𝑚(𝑋𝑠 + 𝑥𝑚) + 𝑠𝑚(𝑥𝑚) 
𝟎 ,𝟎 
Figure 5 A game between one supplier and Boeing (two actions for each player). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From the matrix form, it is clear that there are two Nash equilibria {(K,K), (D,D)}. 
Therefore, the strategies of the stakeholders are not aligned and there is a chance that 
project would be delayed as each supplier considers that other supplier would delay the 
task. Therefore, it is in the best interest of each supplier to delay the specific task. 
• Game between a Supplier and Boeing (three actions for each player) 
Now, we incorporate another action for each of the players to expedite the task. The 
game between one supplier and Boeing is presented in Figure 11. 
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Figure 6 A game between two suppliers and Boeing (two actions for each player).
Now, we extend the game to two suppliers and Boeing. The three players’ game is
presented in Figure 6. The dotted line represents simultaneous game between the two
suppliers as they are assumed to perform the tasks in parallel. Assuming the marginal
penalty being higher than the marginal saving from delaying, the Boeing’s best strategy
is to keep the schedule. Having established this fact from the extensive form of the game,
the game between suppliers can be modeled in matrix form. From the matrix form, it is
clear that the two Nash equilibria are (K,K) and (D,D). Therefore, the strategies of the
stakeholders are not aligned and there is a chance that project would be delayed as each
supplier considers the possibility of other supplier delaying the task.
Now, we extend our model to incorporate the option of expediting a task. The extensive
form of the game is presented in Figure 7. Based on the technique of backward induction,
we can determine the best response of Boeing at each of the terminal nodes. As there is
no other sub-game because of the simultaneous game between two suppliers, the solution
is determined through matrix form of the game. It is easy to interpret that there is
A. Qazi, J. Quigley, and A. Dickson 9consideration of time value of money does not affect the outcome if it is assumed that 
Boeing would always prefer completing the task in time even at the cost of expediting. 
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Figure 7 A game between two suppliers and Boeing (thre actions for each ayer).
only one subgame perfect equilibrium that is the decisio to delay on the part of both
the suppliers because Boeing would have to expedite in order to save the heavy penalty
resulting from the project delay. The consideration of present value of money does not
affect the outcome if it is assumed that Boeing would always prefer completing the task
in time even at the cost of expediting.
7.2 Framework Interface
After analyzing the strategic partnership, it is revealed that the partnership engendered
misaligned objectives among the stakeholders that finally contributed to the game theoretic
risks. As a result of this analysis, three nodes are identified namely ‘fair strategy’, ‘misaligned
objectives’ and ‘game theoretic risks’. The qualitative and quantitative parts of the structure
are determined for subsequent incorporation into the Bayesian network.
7.3 Bayesian Network Analysis
The perceived oversimplified cognitive map of the Boeing 787 Project comprised 27 concepts
and 38 links. The Bayesian belief network based on the cognitive map is depicted in Figure 8.
The model clearly reveals that Boeing was focusing on the opportunities resulting from the
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introduction of unproven technology and unconventional supply chain. After the inferencing
stage, the probability of development time being high was just 0.09 and that of development
cost was 0.22. These favorable results represent the fact that the Boeing management had
ignored the interdependency between risk factors and assumed the events of development
cost and time being high as unlikely. Contrary to the expectations, the project was delayed
by almost 3 years causing major financial penalty to the Boeing.
There were a number of risks associated with the decisions taken by the Boeing man-
agement. The cognitive map of the actual supply chain risks comprised 41 concepts and
63 links. A Bayesian network was modeled following the steps outlined in the framework.
Three nodes identified earlier as ‘fair strategy’, ‘misaligned objectives’ and ‘game theoretic
risks’ were added to the BN. The output of ‘game theoretic risks’ node was linked to the
‘development time’ node. The impact of ‘game theoretic risks’ node on the ‘development
time’ node was quantified based on the game theoretic analysis. The resulting Bayesian
network is presented in Figure 9. The unproven technology resulted in major technological
risks that further affected the intended outcomes. Outsourcing was considered to be a means
of reducing development cost and time; however, it resulted in integration issues as the
Tier-1 suppliers were not proficient in selecting their suppliers. Furthermore, the strategic
partnership was not a fair strategy as it did not provide due incentives to the stakeholders to
keep the schedule in time. This caused increase in the game theoretic risks, being dominant
on other factors affecting the development time.
The management involved in the project was lacking expertise in supply chain risk
management. The expertise would have provided a guard against all the risks in terms of
adopting suitable mitigation strategies. Game theoretic risks are assumed to be independent
of the management expertise as the conventional supply chain risk management does not
focus on analyzing the risks caused by misaligned objectives of the stakeholders. It also
emphasizes the importance of considering unique category of risks within the project risk
assessment and the management must possess the ability to apply Game theory to quantify
such risks.
The initial updating reveals that the probabilities of development cost and time being
high were 0.46 and 0.54 respectively. Different scenarios were generated and the impact
of individual risk factor was determined as shown in Table 1. Management expertise was
found to be the dominant factor influencing development cost as it lowered its probability
being high by 37% in relation to the case with no management expertise in supply chain
risk management.
Game theoretic risks were considered as the dominant factor influencing development time.
Introduction of a fair strategy lowered its probability by 26% in relation to the case with no
fair strategy. Once all the facts were entered in the model, the probabilities of development
cost and time being high were 0.81 and 0.98 respectively indicating high likelihood of the
events. The proactive strategies of ensuring a team with supply chain risk management
expertise, devising a fair strategy, negotiating with the labor union and adopting a thorough
supplier selection process resulted in the probabilities of development cost and time being
high as 0.31 and 0.24 respectively.
7.4 Formulation of a Fair Strategy
The sensitivity analysis of game theoretic risks revealed its major impact on the development
time. Therefore, there is requirement of designing a fair strategy in order to reduce the
game theoretic risks. The main purpose of a fair strategy is to make each player responsible
for one’s own deeds [3]. If the suppliers perform their tasks within stipulated time then
A. Qazi, J. Quigley, and A. Dickson 11
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Table 1 Summary of BBN results.
Scenario Probability of Probability of
development time (more) development cost (high)
Initial updating 0.54 0.46
Management expertise ‘Yes’ 0.42 0.28
Management expertise ‘No’ 0.66 0.65
Fair strategy ‘Yes’ 0.41 0.44
Fair strategy ‘No’ 0.67 0.49
Outsourcing ‘More’ 0.60 0.50
Outsourcing ‘Less’ 0.48 0.43
Composite material ‘More’ 0.54 0.48
Composite material ‘Less’ 0.53 0.45
Modular design ‘More’ 0.55 0.49
Modular design ‘Less’ 0.53 0.44
Supplier selection process ‘Thorough’ 0.53 0.43
Supplier selection process ‘Casual’ 0.55 0.49
Updating of all facts 0.98 0.81
Fair strategy ‘No’ and Management 0.93 0.44
expertise ‘Yes’
Fair strategy ‘Yes’ and Management 0.33 0.35
expertise ‘Yes’
Implementation of proactive strategies 0.24 0.31
consequences of any delay on the part of Boeing would be completely compensated by the
Boeing and in case of suppliers having expedited their tasks, Boeing would have to pay the
reward that did not materialize because of its delay. Similarly, if a supplier is involved in the
delay, it will be proportionately penalized for its part of delay. In case of delay on the part
of both the suppliers and Boeing, the penalty would be paid fairly.
In the presence of a fair strategy, no partner is incentivized to delay the task; therefore, the
project is more likely to be completed in time depending on the other risk factors impacting
the delay. After devising the fair strategy, it is revealed that the already existing variables
pertaining to game theoretic risks remain same and therefore, there is no requirement of
updating the Bayesian network. However, in other situations, the formulation of a policy
may necessitate addition of other nodes into the BN requiring some changes as depicted in
the framework. After introduction of the fair strategy, the game theoretic risks decrease to
the minimum level resulting in lower probability of development time being high.
8 Conclusion
The paper has demonstrated development of a novel framework that combines two com-
plementary techniques of Game theory and Bayesian belief network. The rationale for
development of the framework is based on bridging the research gap in the field of supply
chain risk management. The developed framework has been successfully applied on the
development project of Boeing 787 aircraft. The novel framework captured the dynamics of
interacting risk factors. Bayesian belief network is a useful modeling technique for quanti-
fication of interdependent risk factors. Game theoretic modeling provides an opportunity
to model the risks associated with conflicting incentives among the stakeholders within a
SCOR’14
14 A Novel Framework for Quantification of Supply Chain Risks
supply network. The Game theoretic results were fed in the Bayesian network as inputs.
The results of the study clearly revealed that without mitigating the game theoretic risks,
the objective of timely completion of the project was not materialized. Furthermore, lack of
management expertise was the major factor contributing to overall costs of the project. The
application of this novel risk modeling framework in other supply chain risk projects will
help decision makers visualize holistic view of interdependent risk factors and identify key
risk factors for establishing proactive risk mitigation strategies.
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